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DICTA

CASE COMMENTS
Abatement and Revival-Death of Party and Revival of ActionCauses of,Action Which Survive
By JoHN LAWRENCE KANE JR.

On May 18, 1954, an automobile driven by Russell K. Jensen
was struck by a Publix taxicab. The Jensen automobile then struck
William H. Anderson, a pedestrian, as he was attempting to cross
an intersection. Anderson received injuries which required immediate hospitalization, and which caused him to remain in a coma
from the date of injury until his death on December 31, 1954. The
Colorado National Bank, acting as conservator for Anderson, filed
a personal injury action against Publix Cab Company, its driver,
and Jensen on September 16, 1954. After the death of Anderson, the
bank filed an amended and supplemental complaint substituting
itself as executor in place of its former status as conservator. On
appeal, the judgment of the trial court in favor of the bank was
affirmed. Held: A claim for personal injuries based upon negligence
survives the death of the injured person. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959).
The ancient maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona provides a sufficient insight into the attitude of the common law toward survival actions. In fact, at early common law all actions died
with the person.' Most authorities have.explained this maxim in
terms of the criminal or quasi-criminal origin of wrongs which
later were subject to the writ of trespass. 2 Winfield has observed
that if a wrong is looked upon as having a criminal essence, then
only the actor should be liable. 3 Modern survival statutes, such as
that of Colorado 4 have recognized that not all wrongs or torts have
criminal implications and that it is therefore reasonable to seek
recompense from someone other than the actor. The Colorado statute which governed the instant case provided that "all actions in
law whatsoever, save and except actions for slander and libel, or
trespass for injuries done to the person . . . shall survive to and
against executors, administrators and conservators."'
The fundamental question to be decided was whether a negligence action to recover damages for injuries to the person would
survive the death of the injured person. If the action was one of
trespass, then it could not survive. If, however, an action to recover
damages resulting from the negligence of another was not one of
trespass under the ruling statute, then the action would survive.
Colorado has held that such damages are recoverable where
1 See Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808); cf. Statute 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330)
(declares that henceforth executors shall have an action for trespasses done to their testators).
2 3 Holdsworth, History of English Low 333, 585 (3d ed. 1923).
3 Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort,29 Colum. L. Rev. 239 (1929); see 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries *302.
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-1-9 (1953).
5 Id. (emphasis added) (This statute was amended in 1955 to provide that all actions except
slander and libel survive).
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the executor sued in assumpsit,6 but on numerous occasions, the
Court has held that negligence actions are trespasses and do not
survive.7 Where the action was for malicious prosecution,8 for separate maintenance,' for malpractice, i" and for unlawful expulsion
from membership in a labor union" the Court has held that the
damages were the result of trespass to the person and therefore did
not survive. However, where the actions were related to real estate,12
to money fraudulently obtained, 3 or to choses in action,'14 the actions of trespass were held to be for injuries done to property and
were therefore not within the exceptions of the statute.
In Fish v. Liley,5 the Court held that a claim for wrongful death
survived the death of the tortfeasor even though the tort upon
which it was based was a personal one; the action itself was not
one which survived, but, instead, there was a new action for damages and a property claim which could be asserted since the survival statute did not apply to it.
It would appear from the above authority that negligence actions are trespasses and therefore the rule in Colorado would hold
that a negligence action does not survive to or against executors.
However, in the instant case'6 the Court overruled its previous decisions and held that the term "trespass for injuries done to the
person" as used in the statute is limited to the traditional trespasses
to the person, i.e., assault, battery, and false imprisonment. The
Court ruled that an action based on negligence is an action on the
case 7 and is therefore embraced in the clause "All actions in law
whatsoever.., shall survive. .. "
The Publix case is forced by history to stand alone. Subsequent
legislation has divested it of authority so that presently its position
is unique. It might be said that the Publix decision is a lame-duck
case and that therefore the need for study or consideration of it
may be seriously questioned. However, in a jurisprudential sense,
the need for such study is apparent. The lawyer will note and again
be reminded of the practical importance of knowing the common
law in order to fully understand his case. He will recognize that his
argument will be much stronger if it is rooted in the common law.
Additionally, the Publix opinion merits study because of the
thoroughness of research and the depth and precision of scholarship that have gone into it. If the Publix opinion, along with some
other recent opinions, establishes a standard for research and scholarship for the Colorado bench and bar, then its value is obvious.
6 Kelley

v. Union Pac. Ry., 16 Colo. 455, 27 Pac. 1058 (1891).
7 E.g., Greer v. Greer, 110 Colo. 92, 130 P.2d 1050 (1942).
8 Stanley. v. Petherbride, 96 Colo. 293, 42 P.2d 609 (1935).
9 Greer v. Greer, 110 Colo. 92, 130 P.2d 1050 (1942).
10 Meffley v. Catterson, 132 Colo. 222, 287 P.2d 45 (1955).
11 Clapp v. Williams, 90 Colo. 13, 5 P.2d 45 (1931).
12 Kling v. Phaver, 130 Colo. 159, 274 P.2d 97 (1954).
13 Brown v. Stookey, 134 Colo. 11, 298 P.2d 955 (1956).
14 Swartz v. Rosenkrans, 78 Colo. 167, 240 Pac. 333 (1925).
12 120 Colo. 156, 208 P.2d 930 (1949).
16 Publix Cab Co. v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959).
17 See Prosser, Torts 27 (2d ed. 1955).
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Damages-Pain and Suffering-Per Diem
Argument to Jury
By JEamy E. MILLS
In an action for damages for bodily injuries plaintiff's counsel
in his closing argument to the jury made use of a placard showing
items of damages and suggested amounts to be awarded therefor.
The chart had printed thereon the plaintiff's name, age, life expectancy and medical expenses, including names of hospitals and
physicians who had rendered services. Then was listed a proposed
dollar valuation of the "Pain and Suffering" endured by the plaintiff with a suggested amount per day as an appropriate award to
be made by the jury. "Physical Disability and Inability to Lead
a Normal Life" was similarly charted, as was the item "Loss of
Earnings." Defendant's objection to the use of the placard in front of
the jury was overruled. On appeal, held: The trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in overruling the defendant's objection to the
use of the chart and the argument of the plaintiff's counsel based on
the chart. Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959).
It is worthy of notice that the court, although apparently approving the tactic of plaintiff's counsel, stated that the ultimate
course of judicial opinion on the point is not yet discernible, and
further, that recent holdings are not grounded on reasons of sufficient force either for or against such a tactic.
Even in the face of the above remarks it appears that Florida
is one of the leaders in the approval of such-an argument by counsel. In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Braddock' the Supreme Court of
Florida implicitly endorsed the use of a per diem argument by
affirming a jury verdict for $248,439, which coincided exactly with
the aggregate of the plaintiff's demands as set out on a chart similar to the one involved in the instant case. In Andrews v. Cardosa2
the use of a blackboard to illustrate or aid in an argument was indirectly recognized. The court held that it was in the discretion of
the trial judge to deny the use of such an item.
The general rule is that the trier of facts must determine the
amount to be allowed as compensation for pain and suffering.3 Since
pain and suffering are not precisely measurable and have no market
price the proper amount to be awarded can not be exactly determined. The award must, therefore, meet the standards of fairness
and reasonableness
and must be free from sentimental or fanciful
4
considerations.
The weight of authority favors allowing use of a mathematical
formula on a per diem basis when damages for pain and suffering
are involved. The point-has been squarely passed on and approved
in five states.5 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly
196 So. 2d 127 (Fla.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 892 (1957).
2 97 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1957).
3 15 Am. Jur. Damages § 71 (1938).
4 Id. § 72.
5 Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 80 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1955); Kindler v. Edwards, 126 Ind. App.
261. 130 AI.E. 2d 491 (1955); Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 298 Ky. 706, 183 S.W.2d 637 (1944); Four-County
Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss. 403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1954); J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v.
Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
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sanctioned the use of a mathematical formula in determining the
amount of an award for pain and suffering.6 Minnesota can probably
be added
to the list of states allowing per diem argument to the
7
jury.
New Jersey in the recent case of Botta v. Bruner8 has estab-.
lished itself as the first state to expressly forbid the use of a formula, although Pennsylvania has followed an unswerving course
of condemnation of any reference to amount of damages for pain
and suffering since 1891.1 The Supreme Court of New Jersey in
the Botta opinion not only held that a mathematical formula is an
improper suggestion to the jury but that any statement by counsel
demanding a specific award or disclosing the amount sued for (ad
damnum clause) will constitute error.
Arguments advanced in support of mathematical formulas and
per diem awards are: (1) While presenting his case, counsel has a
wide latitude of reference'0 and may draw any reasonable inferences from the evidence;" (2) Some guidance to the jury is necessary because there is no exact scale on which to measure the extent of injury; 12 (3) Such per diem arguments are not evidence
and are merely used as illustration and suggestion; 13 (4) The suggestion of a dollar-and-cent value for pain is no more than one
method of reasoning which the jury is entitled to hear in attempt6 Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
7 See Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 87 N.W.2d 633 (1958) (use of mathematical formula
proper for purely illustrative purposes); Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W.2d
30 (1956) (verdict upheld notwithstanding objection to per diem argument with mathematical formula).
But see Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M.Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W.2d 873 (1955) (court castigated
the idea of reaching the award on a per diem basis); Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81,
69 N.W.2d 673, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 874 (1955) (verdict of $170,000 arrived at by mathematical
formula held excessive because it did not meet test of reasonableness).
8 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
9 Stassum v. Chapin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 Ati. 111 (1936); Joyce v. Smith, 269 Pa. 439, 112 AtI. 549
(1921); Bostic v. Pittsburg Rys., 255 Pa. 387, 100 AtI. 123 (1917); Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Ry., 177 Pa.
1, 35 AtI. 191 (1896); Baker v. Pennsylvania Ry., 142 Pa. 503, 21 AtI. 979 (1891).
10 Nusbaum v. Pennsylvania R.R., 340 III. App. 131. 90 N.E.2d 921 (1950).
11 Hayes v. Coleman. 338 Mich. 371, 61 N.W.2d 634 (1953).
12 Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F.2d 4 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956).
13 Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240, 80 N.W. 2d 30 (1956).
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ing to appraise the amount of compensation
to be awarded based
14
on their common sense and judgment.
Authorities opposing such an argument to the jury rely on the
following propositions: (1) There is no legal yardstick for the
measurement of pain and suffering; 1 5 (2) The per diem suggestion
by counsel takes the place of evidence in the mind of the jury, and
admonitions by the court not to consider the per diem argument
as evidence fail to erase all prejudicial effect; 6 (3) The employment of a per diem argument by plaintiff's counsel is prejudicial
to the right of the defendant's counsel for equal opportunity to offer
proof and submit arguments thereon. This is so because if the defendant's counsel suggests a lower per diem argument
he fortifies his
17
adversary's suggestion of a per diem formula.
The exact point in the instant case has not been raised in the
Colorado Supreme Court. It is difficult to see how the jury is put in
an unfavorable position if sound arguments in favor of and against
assessment of damages by a per diem formula are presented to
them. Should their verdict prove excessive, the judicial practices of
remittitur or setting aside the verdict can be employed by the court
in order to see that equity is attained. To deprive the plaintiff's
counsel of one of his techniques of advocacy seems unjuust since
the very essence of his argument is persuasion. Damages must be
awarded in cash! To allow counsel to suggest to the jury the most
logical method by which they can reduce pain and suffering to
money value seems the proper way to do equity to all parties involved.
The modern trend is toward the "Belli approach"'18 and it is
hoped that the Colorado Supreme Court will allow use by counsel
of per diem arguments involving a mathematical formula for computing damages for pain and suffering. Although the author is not
fully in accord with many of the techniques set forth by Mr. Belli,
it is thought that the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Botta v. Bruner will not serve to eliminate the theatrical tactics
at which it is evidently aimed.
14
15
16
17
18

Arnold v. Ellis, 97 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1957).
Herb v. Hallowell, 304 Pa. 128, 154 Atl. 582 (1931).
Ahlstrom v. Minneopois, St. P. & S.S.M.Ry., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W. 2d 873 (1955).
Botta v. Bruner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
See generally Belli, Modern Trials, ch. 8 (1954).
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